This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identify monetary policy shocks and their macroeconomic effects for the Italian economy in the 90s. The analysis is based on a detailed institutional description of the functioning of the domestic market for bank reserves. In this setting, we try to establish if monetary policy shocks are better identified using exchange rates or foreign exchange reserves as a conditioning variable for the small open economy framework. Our analysis confirms the view that the Bank of Italy has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans in the 90s. This is coherent with either proposed modeling choices. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how they impact the economy.
Introduction
Many recent studies have been devoted to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks on output and inflation. Most of the studies focusing on the short-run response of the economy to monetary policy have been conducted by using the methodology of Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR).
1 This approach has the advantage of imposing a minimal set of theoretical restrictions on the model to be tested, thereby allowing for a close-to-pure statistical investigation of the time series properties of the variables included in the analysis. In this literature, a monetary policy shock is identified with the residual of an equation regressing a monetary policy instrument on a set of variables that are considered relevant for the decisions of the central bank. Hence, monetary policy shocks are defined as statistical innovations and represent a purely exogenous component of policy. Impulse responses of different macroeconomic variables to these shocks are not subject to the rationalexpectation critique 2 and can then be interpreted as the empirical dynamics beyond the comparative statics exercises developed in standard equilibrium analysis. A drawback of this analysis is that the impulse responses do not consider the "endogenous" component of monetary policy, such as any feedback rule linking policy to the state of the economy.
3 Indeed, this endogenous component might well be even more important than the exogenous one. However, it is hard to identify and single out the original source of the many shocks hitting the economy and to which policy responds. Hence, the consequences of these endogenous changes in monetary policy are more difficult to interpret as they combine the effect of the original shocks and that of the policy reaction.
Most of these studies have adopted a closed economy framework. Identifying monetary policy shocks in an open economy context presents some additional difficulties. These are usually due to the simultaneous reaction between interest and exchange rates innovations, which in turn can be responsible for the emergence of new empirical puzzles, as the one of an impact depreciation of the exchange rate following a monetary policy contraction in the domestic country. Bagliano, Favero and Franco (1999) provides a complete discussion of the topic by estimating a twocountry model including Germany and the US.
In this paper we present different model specifications that can be used to identify monetary policy operating regimes and monetary policy shocks in a small open economy. More precisely, we focus on the Italian economy in the 90s and try to establish if monetary policy shocks are better identified using exchange rates or foreign exchange reserves as a conditioning variable for the small open economy framework. 4 In our sample, we have two periods of quasi-fixed nominal exchange rates (1989.06-1992.09; 1996.11-1998.04 ) and one of free floating (1992.10 -1996.10) . Given the limited span of the subperiods and the monthly frequency of the data, we treat the whole sample as one of managed floating of the Lira and propose different model specifications to check whether the identification of the central bank operating regime and of the monetary policy shocks is robust enough.
Our methodology is based on De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998), which in turn extended to a small open economy the research strategy introduced by Strongin (1995) and further developed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for the US. More precisely, we give a structural content to the VAR models by linking econometric analysis with the institutional knowledge of how the market for banks reserves (i.e., the market in which monetary policy is actually conducted) works in Italy. In our estimated models, indeed, identification hinges on a detailed description of the operating procedures used by the Bank of Italy. The advantage of this procedure is that it allows for a direct test of different model alternatives that are nested in the same specification, without imposing a priori one identification mechanism. The correct measure of a monetary policy shock is then selected by the data itself.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly motivate our interest for the Italian economy, while in section 3 we discuss how it is possible to combine vector autoregression techniques with institutional analysis. In section 4 we first estimate in a larger sample the model proposed in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998); we also extend it to include a foreign (German) short-term interest rate. In section 5 we study a modified version of the model that explicitly focuses on the role of foreign exchange reserves. We summarize our conclusions in section 6.
Motivation
We believe that Italy provides an interesting case study for different reasons.
First, important institutional changes have affected, in the last decade, both the degree of economic and political independence 5 of the Bank of Italy, as well as the environment in which monetary policy is decided and implemented. In terms of central bank independence, between 1992 and 1994 a series of laws were passed giving the central bank Governor the exclusive responsibility to set and change the monetary policy instruments (the discount rate and the reserve coefficient, as well as the growth rate of the monetary base). In particular, any source of direct and permanent financing of the Treasury deficit via high-power money was prohibited.
6
As regards the modus operandi of monetary policy, this had already been substantially modified by the introduction, at the end of the 80s, of a series of important institutional changes in the money market. A screen-based market for Treasury Bills (MTS) was opened in 1988, the one for interbank deposits (MID) in 1990. The mandatory reserve regime was also gradually reformed (starting in 1990) so as to allow banks to average provisions in the maintenance period. Other important changes have been the abolition of the floor price on T-Bills auctions (1988) and a new discipline in terms of fixed-term advances.
7
Second, in the 90s, Italy achieved a stable reduction in the inflation rate. This was accompanied by a lower-than-average rate of economic growth with respect to previous decades. Economic growth was also considerably lower, in this period, than in other European countries that were facing similar (although smaller in magnitude) problems in terms of fiscal adjustment required to meet the Maastricht budget criteria. It is important to assess the role that monetary policy played in generating these macroeconomic outcomes.
Third, Italy can be viewed as a good example of a "small" open economy. Most of the studies on the US and Germany are conducted either in a closed economy framework (e.g., Mihov, 1997 and or with a two-country model 5 Political independence is defined as the ability of the central bank to establish its policy targets without government interference. Economic independence is defined as the ability of the central bank to autonomously activate its instruments in order to reach the monetary policy goals. See Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) .
6 See Passacantando (1996) . Price stability was explicitly stated as the primary target of monetary policy only in 1998.
7 See Gaiotti (1992) and Sarcinelli (1995) . (Bagliano, Favero and Franco, 1999 
Methodology
From an empirical point of view, it is essential to be able to isolate purely exogenous policy shocks. In the case of monetary policy, if we just focused on monetary policy "actions", including feedback responses of policy to many other possible shocks hitting the economy, we would never come up with a measure of the macroeconomic effects originated by a purely exogenous change in monetary policy. We would only describe the mixed effects originated by different heterogeneous shocks and by how policy makers react to these shocks. Even though this reaction might in practice account for most of ordinary monetary policy interventions, we would still like to investigate the effects of a monetary policy shock isolated both by other kinds of shocks in the economy and by the endogenous changes that these other shocks might push. Moreover, the responses to unforecastable (and structural) innovations are less subject to the Lucas' critique. Structural VARs have been useful in pursuing this strategy. In a structural VAR, after the estimation of the unrestricted vector autoregression (i.e., with no contemporaneous interactions among the variables), the econometric identification of economically meaningful (i.e., structural) innovations occurs in a second stage where reasonable constraints must be introduced.
8 These constraints are typically designed as restrictions on the contemporaneous influence among fundamental (i.e., non-structural) and structural innovations, where the latter are assumed to be mutually and serially uncorrelated. Basically, the analyst has to make a number of identifying assumptions in order to be able to estimate the reaction function of the central bank, including assumptions on what variables are monitored and on what kind of interaction the exogenous policy shock has with variables in the reaction function of the monetary authority (the so called endogenous component" of policy). The main identifying assumption is that policy shocks have to be orthogonal to variables in the reaction function of the central bank.
9 Hence, within the system of equations in the VAR, policy shocks can be estimated as the residuals in the linear regression of the central bank instrument on the variables in the central bank reaction function. According to this assumption, the monetary policy instrument changes following a contemporaneous innovation to the variables in the information set of the central bank; while these latter variables are constrained to have 8 See Amisano and Giannini (1997, chap. 1) . Technically, the estimation of a structural VAR with Choleski decomposition can be developed equation by equation with ordinary least squares, by using the properties of a Wold causal chain.
9 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) call this the Recursiveness Assumption.
no contemporaneous reaction to a change in the policy instrument. Obviously, this assumption can be sensibly maintained when the observation period is one month. It is less acceptable when the VAR deals with yearly or even quarterly data.
10
Structural VARs where one variable is assumed to be the monetary policy instrument have been estimated for the US economy by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , who used the Fed Funds rate, or by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) , who selected the nonborrowed reserves aggregate. Mihov (1997, 1998) have generalized this approach by considering a vector of policy variables, instead of just one policy variable. In the first stage, the estimation of an unrestricted VAR generates two subvectors of innovations, one related to nonpolicy variables (u y,t ) and one to policy variables (u 
where R(L) is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L and R(0) = I; y t is the vector of nonpolicy variables and p t is the vector of policy variables.
In the estimation of the orthogonalized, economically meaningful (structural) innovations in the second stage, a recursive causal block-order is assumed from the set of nonpolicy variables to the set of policy variables. Moreover, the recursive causal order is also established for the nonpolicy variables in y t . In terms of the relationship between the fundamental innovations, u y,t and u p,t , and the structural innovations, ν y,t and ν p,t , which are mutually and serially uncorrelated, this implies:
where A 1,1 is lower-triangular and B 1,1 is diagonal so that there is a Wold recursive (causal) ordering among the nonpolicy variables in y t . Moreover, A 2,1 is a full matrix so that there is a Wold block-recursive (causal) ordering between nonpolicy and policy variables.
Building on previous work by Strongin (1995) , the vector of policy variables contains aggregates and interest rates characterizing the market for bank reserves. As a matter of fact, monetary policy is effectively conducted through the market for bank reserves. The idea is then that, in order to correctly identify a monetary policy shock, it could be useful to model the different operating procedures of the central bank according to appropriate constraints in the relationship between u p,t and ν p,t . Hence, the core of the analysis focuses on the shape that the matrices A 2,2 and B 2,2 must take for the different operating procedures to work properly. This requires linear and nonlinear constraints on the elements of those two matrices. A test for overidentifying restrictions can finally be applied to check whether the constraints implied by the different regimes are rejected by the data. Impulse response functions of policy and nonpolicy variables to monetary shocks are used to further check whether the identified monetary-policy innovations can be plausibly qualified so.
12
10 An alternative identifying assumption is to exclude contemporaneous reaction of the policy instrument to variables in the central bank information set while allowing the latter to contemporaneously respond to changes in the policy instrument. See Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) .
11 Bold lower-case (capital) letters indicate vectors (matrices). 12 In this empirical approach to monetary policy, nonstationarity of the data is not generally
A model of the Italian Economy
In this section we summarize and re-estimate in a larger sample the model in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) . This model uses the empirical framework described in section 3 and extends it to a small open economy framework in order to study the conduct of monetary policy in Italy in the 90s.
13
We define different monetary regimes according to the necessary constraints implied on the central bank operating procedures in the domestic market for bank reserves. In the VAR model we include two nonpolicy variables: Italian consumer prices and an index of the Italian industrial production. Moreover, in some specifications, the German call money rate is also included. These nonpolicy variables affect the estimation as they enter in the reaction function of the central bank.
The small open economy feature is modeled by including the exchange rate visa-vis Germany in the analysis (besides the German call money rate when included in the nonpolicy block). As we have both periods of quasi-fixed exchange rates and of free floating in the sample, we chose to consider the real exchange rate in our VAR model. On one side, this has the advantage of guaranteeing some variability even with targeted nominal exchange rates. On the other side, it shows a quasi identical short-run pattern given the existence of nominal rigidities and it is surely a better variable to look at in terms of the monetary transmission mechanism.
14 In the model, the exchange rate is listed last, after the block of policy variables. Indeed, although the exchange rate is clearly a nonpolicy variable, we cannot exclude the contemporaneous reaction of the exchange rate to innovations in the policy variables, in particular to innovations in the short-term rate.
Hence, the relationship among fundamental and structural innovations can be summarized as follows:
emphasized and cointegration analysis not undertaken. A first justification is that the data may be quasi-nonstationary; in fact, the presence of unit roots in the time series cannot be tested with high power (see, for instance, Campbell and Perron, 1991). Moreover, even though unit roots may characterize the data, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that most traditional, standard asymptotic tests are still valid if the VAR is estimated in levels. The neglecting of cointegration constraints is motivated by the following considerations. First, the analysis is generally focused on short-run constraints and the short-run dynamic response of the system. When cointegration constraints are excluded, this only implies that the long-run responses of some variables are not constrained and might follow a divergent path. However, the short-run analysis is still valid. Second, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) proved that standard asymptotic inference is not affected even when the variables included in the VAR in levels are cointegrated. Finally, although FIML estimates are no longer efficient if cointegration constraints are not included, they still remain consistent. Hence, the lower efficiency in the estimates can be justified by the objective difficulty in the economic interpretation of some of the cointegration constraints showed by the data.
13 See Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) for similar studies on monetary policy in Germany.
14 Kim and Roubini (1995) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) also used the real exchange rate although they did not have any problem of quasi-fixed exchange rate regime in their studies and could have chosen the nominal one.
where u r,t and ν r,t are respectively the fundamental and structural innovation related to the real exchange rate; a 3,1 and a 3,2 are full (row) vectors and the (column) vector b 2,3 represents the possible correlations between the structural innovations in the market for bank reserves (including a possible monetary policy-induced variable) and the structural innovations in the exchange rate.
The core of our identification strategy is in the lower-right corner of the system, which models the market for bank reserves and explicitly considers the role of the exchange rate:
The Italian Market for Bank Reserves
A description of how the Italian market for bank reserves works and of the operating procedures of the Bank of Italy is given in Buttiglione, Del Giovane and Gaiotti (1997) . 15 Here we simply explain our model equations. In terms of innovations, we specify the demand for total reserves as:
where u T R is the innovation in total reserves, u OV is the innovation in the overnight interest rate and ν d is the unit-variance, orthogonal innovation in the demand for total reserves (i.e., an indicator of the shifting in the demand for total reserves); σ d is a measure of the standard deviation of the structural shock assigned to this equation. We use the rate on overnight loans since this has recently become the most important interest rate in the market for bank reserves.
We then divide the total amount of bank reserves in the sum of two aggregates that we define, in line with the US literature, as borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. We define fixed-term advances as borrowed reserves.
17 The nonborrowed reserves aggregate thus includes the item Anticipazioni Ordinarie
18 and all open-market operations. Our sorting can be motivated by the fact that Anticipazioni Ordinarie: a) were of limited amount, established by the central bank; b) should have rationally been used first as the least-costly source of finance;
19 and c) could in principle be canceled by the Bank of Italy with short notice.
20
15 See also De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) . 16 We omit the time subscript t to ease notation. 17 Fixed-term advances (Anticipazioni a Scadenza Fissa) is an explicit standing facility that could be automatically drawn by banks and on which a penalty rate is applied. This "ceiling" rate in the money market was established by the central bank analogously to the discount rate. The two official interest rates defined a corridor that normally contained the every-day fluctuations of all other money-market rates.
18 A credit line that banks could activate with the Bank of Italy, providing a limited amount of low-cost finance. The discount rate (tasso ufficiale di sconto), usually a floor for money market rates, was the cost paid by banks on the amount of credit effectively drawn from this line.
19 In reality, though, this credit line is never completely used since many cash managers keep a portion of the line as a buffer stock. However, the unused credit is quantitatively negligible.
20 A similar choice was made in Bernanke and Mihov (1997) for Germany.
In terms of innovations, the demand for fixed-term advances can be expressed as a positive function of the spread between the overnight rate and the rate on fixed-term advances:
where u F T A is the innovation in the fixed-term advances and u i F T A is the innovation in the interest rate on fixed-term advances; ν b is a unit-variance, orthogonal shock related to the borrowed-reserves component (i.e., a measure of the shift in the demand for fixed-term advances) and σ b is the standard deviation of the structural shock related to this equation. Since the rate on fixed-term advances has always been changed discretely and according to monetary-policy decisions during the period under investigation, we set u i F T A = 0 and consider only innovations in the overnight interest rate as a determinant of the demand for fixed-term advances.
21
We then model the central-bank direct intervention in the market for bank reserves by specifying how it supplies nonborrowed reserves, namely:
where ν r is the unit-variance, orthogonal innovation in the real exchange rate (to be defined in the last equation), whereas ν s is the own (unit-variance and orthogonal) innovation in monetary policy, a measure of the exogenous component of the monetary policy stance; σ s is the standard deviation of this measure. The latter equation represents the operating reaction function of the monetary authorities in the market for bank reserves. An innovation in the supply of nonborrowed reserves is designed to offset structural innovations in the demand for total reserves (ν d ), in the demand for borrowed reserves (ν b ) and in the exchange rate (ν r ); u N BR could be also induced by an exogenous innovation in monetary policy. The three innovations on the quantitative variables are not independent since u T R ≡ u F T A + u N BR . Hence, u N BR can be replaced in the last equation by the difference between the innovation in total reserves and the innovation in the demand for fixed-term advances. As a result, by substituting equations (2) and (3) in (4), the latter can be rewritten as follows:
Finally, the equation for the exchange rate 23 establishes that its innovation can be affected by the innovations in all the other variables included in the VAR. We can thus write
The same strategy, with respect to the discount rate, has been applied by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) in their study of US monetary policy. Alternatively, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) considered an additional equation for the rate on fixed-term advances when studying German monetary policy. 22 The following is the correct formulation, given that our notation is slightly different from the one in Bernanke and Mihov (1998) . In De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) the corresponding equation contained a mistake which however did not affect the results of the estimation.
23 In our definition, an increase (decrease) in the exchange rate represents a real depreciation (appreciation) of the Lira with respect to the DM.
where obviously γ T R = γ T R + γ N BR and γ F T A = −γ N BR .
Equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) provide the specified version of (1) for our model. In extensive form:
The order condition for the identification of the complete VAR model is violated since 21 variances and covariances are available from the first stage of the estimation and these are not sufficient to obtain the 23 parameters included in the structural form, whose lower-right corner is 6). Identification can be achieved by imposing appropriate constraints that reflect different operating procedures of monetary policy. We describe two possible monetary regimes based on these operating procedures, one based on the control of the overnight rate and the other on the control of the nonborrowed reserves aggregate 24 . Technically, these regimes correspond to two distinct overidentified structures that can be tested in order to select which one, if any, is accepted by the data. In our framework, overidentification requires fixing 3 parameters.
(1) OV Regime. In this policy regime the monetary authorities offset all exogenous shifts in the market for bank reserves (i.e., all the structural innovations ν d and ν b ) so as to control the overnight rate. In terms of parameter constraints this means that φ d = σ d and φ b = −σ b . Moreover, the authorities are also assumed not to allow the supply of nonborrowed reserves to respond to innovations in the exchange rate: i.e., φ r = 0. Therefore, eq. (5) becomes:
and the relative estimated indicator of monetary policy shocks (i.e., σ s ν s ) is proportional to the estimated innovation in the overnight interest rate.
(2) NBR Regime. In this quantitative regime the monetary authorities are assumed to offset exogenous shifts in the market for bank reserves in order to control the total amount of nonborrowed reserves. In this case, the central bank's operating procedures imply φ d = 0, φ b = 0 and φ r = 0 as the appropriate parameter constraints. The estimated indicator of monetary policy shocks then coincides with the innovation in the nonborrowed components of reserves:
Data, Estimation and Results
We estimate the model between June 1989 and May 1998. The sample does not include the 80s as in this period monetary policy in Italy could not be described as following a market-based approach. We also excluded the last months of 1998, following the announcement of which "countries" would have entered the EMU. All data are monthly. The variables included in the VAR are (from top to bottom): the consumer price index and the industrial production index as nonpolicy variables; total bank reserves, fixed-term advances and the overnight interest rate as policy variables; finally, the real exchange rate between Italy and Germany as the last variable. The price index, the industrial production index and the real exchange rate have been log-transformed. Total reserves and fixed-term advances have been normalized by dividing them by the 18-month (past) moving average of total reserves in order to use the level relationship among total reserves, fixed-term advances and nonborrowed reserves.
25 Since the Italian banking system experienced some relevant changes in the reserve requirement ratios in the sample period, we used the adjusted series for total bank reserves offered by the Bank of Italy.
26 The overnight rate is in levels. Further details on the data are given in the Appendix.
The number of lags employed is six and the estimation is based on the FIML method. As shown in Table 1 , the results in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) are confirmed. In particular, the regime based on controlling the overnight rate is accepted, while the overidentifying test rejects the hypothesis that the Bank of Italy in the 90s was targeting the nonborrowed reserves aggregate. Table 1 shows estimation results for both the whole sample period and the subsample following the exit of the Italian Lira from the "hard EMS".
27 Although the estimated elasticities are different, the conclusions of the overidentifying tests are robust to the change in the estimation period.
28
25 Bernanke and Mihov (1998) claim that this kind of strategy is more appropriate than the short-run normalization proposed by Strongin (1995) . 26 The only available data on total reserves (adjusted for the numerous changes in the required reserves ratio) and fixed-term advances refer to the maintenance period of required reserves that does not coincide with the calendar month (the maintenance period goes from the 15th of one month to the 14th of the next one). All the other data are instead referred to the common calendar month. This mismatch may cause some problems in the relationship between the reserve aggregates and the other data within the month. The problem may appear particularly serious for the relationship between reserves aggregates and the overnight rate, on which it hinges our identification procedure. However, when we compared our time series for the interest rate with another series that matches the reserve aggregate period, we found very high correlation in both levels and in first differences between the series. Hence, the bias introduced by the mismatch does not seem to be operatively very relevant, although methodologically important.
27 Although technically the Lira rejoined a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime in November 1996, the new ERM was characterized by such wide bands that it could be regarded as quite similar to managed floating.
28 In order to check more formally for possible instability in the estimated coefficients of the The impulse responses to the monetary policy shocks in the two estimated regimes are shown in Figures 1 and 2 .
29 These pictures provide further support to the OV regime.
In Figure 1 , after a monetary contraction, output falls at impact. The slowdown in economic activity lasts for about two years, but it is statistically significant only in the period included between the 8 th and the 18 th month after the shock. Although we have not included a commodity price index, we find no evidence of a price puzzle. 30 The response in terms of the price level is not significantly different from zero.
31 The model does not exhibit a liquidity effect either. As a matter of fact, although fixed-term advances (FTA) increase considerably at impact and in the first 3 months after the shock, total reserves do not show any significant dynamics. Hence, nonborrowed reserves fall, exactly as predicted by the standard liquidity effect. Finally, the response of the exchange rate is never statistically significant at our confidence level. Overall, these IRFs seem coherent with textbook predictions of the effects of a monetary policy shock. We interpret them as a signal of correct, reduced-form VAR, we performed standard stability test (Hansen, 1992) . The results detect no evidence of instability in the equation coefficients: all statistics are below 0.1, with just two exceptions (0.14 and 0.27) that are still well below the 5% critical value (0.470). Among the six equations, only the one for the interest rate shows instability in the variance, which might be due to the presence of ARCH effects.
29 The impulse response functions are relative to the whole sample. They have been constructed by designing a restrictive monetary shock leading to a 100 basis-point increase in the overnight rate for all the monetary regimes. Responses in output, prices and the exchange rate are percent deviations from the corresponding variables' values before the shock. Dashed-line bands refer to the 95% confidence interval and are computed by the delta method (Hamilton, 1994, and Amisano and Giannini, 1997) .
30 In the smaller sample estimated in De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998), the puzzle was still present, although only temporary (the first 4 periods) and much less intensively than in previous VAR analysis. 31 The response of prices in European countries has already been documented to be less pronounced than in the US (Smets, 1997), when not totally counterintuitive (Sims, 1992 ). An explanation for the lower price sensitivity to monetary policy shocks in Europe might be related to the presence of stronger nominal rigidities.
although still parsimonious, specification of the statistical model.
32
The IRF shown in Figure 2 are relative to a monetary policy shock in the NBR regime. They are clearly less appealing, when not intuitively totally wrong. Following the same monetary contraction, the reduction in output is practically never statistically significant and prices show a persistent increase. The response of the exchange rate indicates a real depreciation following (for about one year) the monetary contraction.
In order to check for the robustness of our results, we extend our model to include the German call money rate as an additional variable in the nonpolicy block. Given the exogeneity of the German rate with respect to all the other domestic variables, we list it first in the nonpolicy block.
33 Estimation results are shown in Table 2 . Once again, the OV regime is confirmed by the data, both in the whole sample and also in the subsample 1993:3-1998:5. The small open economy feature of Italy might as well be captured by using foreign reserves as an alternative to the exchange rate. This would correspond to assuming managed floating of the Lira over the whole sample under consideration. Although such a working hypothesis is obviously an approximation, it is not much stronger than the previous assumption of free floating of the real exchange rate vis a vis the D-mark. In this section we will test whether such an alternative specification produces similar or different results in terms of the identification of the central-bank operating regime and of the exogenous monetary policy shocks. We replace (the log of) the exchange rate with (the log of) foreign reserves in the policy block of the VAR model. The relevant equations become (2) and (3) plus 32 We computed the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVD) of both the price level and output. This exercise (available on request from the author) provides information about the quantitative importance of each of the identified structural shocks in explaining the variability of our nonpolicy variables. Exogenous monetary policy shocks account (significantly at the 95% level) for about 15 to 20% of the output volatility one year after the shock, while their contribution to price volatility is almost null. Exactly the opposite is true for exogenous shocks to the real exchange rate: these have been particularly effective on price dynamics. While, exogenous monetary policy shocks were important in determining output dynamics, the sharp reduction in inflation of the 90s might instead be explained by either the endogenous component of monetary policy or by the dynamics of the exchange rate. Indeed, we have also estimated a simple forward looking monetary policy rule a la Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998 and 1999b) for Italy in the 90s and obtained that the coefficient on deviations of inflation from target was significantly higher than 1 (1.3), while the one on output stabilization was not statistically different from zero. We interpret this finding as suggesting that the endogenous component of Italian monetary policy in the 90s, as embedded in such a simple monetary policy rule, was focusing on inflation and not on output stabilization.
33 See also Chinn and Dooley (1997) . 34 IRFs relative to monetary policy shocks look very similar to the ones of the benchmark model and are available from the authors upon request. In particular, in the OV regime prices decrease after 4 months, but the response is still of a small magnitude; output decreases, although the standard errors of the estimated IRFs are slightly higher. Moreover, a German restrictive monetary innovation raising the German rate by 100 basis points increases the Italian rate by more than 200 basis points after one month and monotonically declines after seven months. (5) and (6) above:
In this model foreign reserves are allowed to react contemporaneously to fundamental innovations in all policy variables, exactly as done before for the exchange rate. In addition we explicitly take into account the possibility that the central bank sterilizes either fundamental or structural innovations to foreign reserves when choosing the supply of nonborrowed reserves. We still have 21 variances and covariances from the first stage estimation, but now 24 parameters are to be estimated. In order to overidentify and estimate the model, we thus need at least 4 short-run restrictions. We start by studying the two monetary regimes analyzed in the previous section: an interest rate targeting regime based on the control of the overnight (OV regime) and a quantitative regime controlling the supply of nonborrowed reserves (NBR regime). But we do also estimate two modified versions of these regimes where innovations in foreign reserves do also partly contribute to identify exogenous monetary policy shocks. In the modified OV regime, the identified monetary policy shocks will correspond to a linear combination of the fundamental innovations in both the overnight rate and foreign reserves. In the modified NBR regime, monetary policy shocks will be identified as the component of innovations to nonborrowed reserves which is orthogonal to fundamental innovations in foreign reserves. Formally, the four regimes are identified by the following constraints.
• OV Regime: • Modified OV Regime:
The estimation results are presented in Table 3 . The only model which is clearly rejected by the overidentification test is the NBR Regime. The model based on controlling the overnight rate is accepted with the highest probability. It does also produce estimates of the parameters α and β which are on line with our previous results and similar impulse response functions (see Figure 3 ) . In particular, output falls for about two years after a monetary contraction, while the price level does not significantly react. A modified version of the OV regime where monetary policy shocks are identified by a linear combination of innovations to the overnight rate and to foreign reserves is also accepted, and the generated IRFs (see Figure 4 ) are basically identical, although the parameter α is significantly of the wrong sign in this model. Finally, even though also the modified version of the NBR regime is accepted, its IRFs are considerably less satisfactory, as we do not obtain any significant output response and we find evidence of both a price and a liquidity puzzle (see Figure 5) .
Overall, our results seem to reinforce our previous conclusion that a model of interest rate targeting was indeed followed by the Bank of Italy in the 90s. The data support our findings under different choices in terms of the macroeconomic variable used to characterize the small open economy framework, exchange rates versus foreign reserves.
37
35 We cannot estimate simultaneously ψ and φ F as the model turns out to be not identified in the rank condition.
36 In this case, we can directly estimate both ψ and φ F as the model is identified in the rank condition. 37 We also tried to estimate a 7-variable VAR including both the exchange rate vis a vis Germany and foreign reserves, but serious convergence problems were detected. Instead, a 7-variable VAR including the German call money rate (as at the end of Section 4.2) and foreign exchange reserves was estimated for the "pure" OV and NBR regimes: again, only the OV regime is not rejected by the overidentifying test. 
Conclusions
This paper presents different model specifications that are useful to identify monetary policy shocks in a small open economy framework. By focusing on the Italian economy in the 90s, it shows that correct identification can be obtained by linking econometric analysis with a detailed description of the institutional and operative procedures used by the central bank to intervene in the domestic money market. Our results can be summarized as follows.
In the 90s, monetary policy in Italy has been based on an interest rate targeting regime, with the central bank controlling the rate on overnight loans. This conclusion holds using both exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves as conditioning variables for the small open economy framework under study. Moreover, our results are confirmed even when including a short-term foreign interest rate (the German call money rate). Shocks to the overnight rate, or the residual of a regression of this rate on a set of variables in the information set of the central bank, can then be interpreted as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks, as opposed to the endogenous component of policy which might result from a feedback rule linking the monetary policy instrument to different state variables.
Our impulse response analysis is broadly coherent with the expected effect of a monetary policy shock on output and inflation.
Appendix: Data Sources
All the data used in the analysis and the relative sources are listed:
• Italian price level: Italian CPI (1990=100), line 64 in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CDROM version (IFS);
• industrial production index: line 61 in IFS;
• total bank reserves: period average, series adjusted for the change in the required reserves ratio; January 1987-December 1987 series S275391M, in Banca d'Italia, Base Informativa Pubblica(BIP) April 1997; January 1988-May 1998 applied growth rates contained in series S393004M, BIP November 1998;
• fixed-term advances (Anticipazioni a Scadenza Fissa): period average, series S987727M in BIP;
• overnight interest rate: from Datastream;
• nominal Lit/DM exchange rate: computed as a cross rate from the dollar exchange rates contained in IFS;
• German price level: German CPI (1990=100), line 64 in IFS;
• Foreign Reserves: cumulated variations in Foreign Reserves starting in 1970:1 (plus an additional component of 15000 in order to avoid negative numbers and take the log transformation); variation in Foreign Reserves is series 08645 in BIP.
• German call money rate: line 60b in IFS;
The real exchange rate has been obtained by dividing the product of the nominal exchange rate times the German price level, by the Italian price level.
